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ABSTRACT
The regulation of casinos in Austria is unique because of the gambling
monopoly vested into the Austrian Government by the Gambling Act. By law
and regulation, casino operations and politics are uniquely intertwined in Austria.
The Ministry of Finance is the sole federal gambling authority and responsible
not only for the distribution of casino licenses but also for the implementation of
measures to protect gamblers and prevent money laundering and fraud in casinos.
On the surface, the design of this system appears to be set up for conflicts of
interest to arise.
This article critically outlines the evolution and operation of Austria’s laws
relating to casinos, drawing particular attention to the concerns arising from
political participation and interference in Austria’s casino industry and the
federal Ministry of Finance’s obligation to regulate casino operations and raise
taxes whilst protecting problem gamblers and other vulnerable groups. The
article first explains the historical development of casino gambling in Austria,
outlines the legal framework of the State’s gambling monopoly, before turning
to the licensing procedure and governance of Austrian casinos, and lastly to
regulations concerning the protection of casino gamblers. The article closes with
a summary of observations and a reflection on the way ahead.

I. INTRODUCTION
The regulation of casinos in Austria is unique in the European Union and
worldwide because of the gambling monopoly vested into the Austrian
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Government by the Gambling Act.1 There are, however, no fully state-owned
casinos; instead the right to operate casinos has been granted to a sole business
enterprise, the partly state-owned, publicly listed Casinos Austria AG.
Through shares and regulation, casino operations and politics are uniquely
intertwined in Austria. The Ministry of Finance is the sole federal gambling
authority and responsible not only for the distribution of casino licenses but also
for the implementation of measures to protect gamblers and prevent money
laundering and fraud in casinos.2 On the surface, the design of this system
appears to be set up for conflicts of interest to arise, also considering that the
Austrian Government financially benefits from casino revenues and through
taxation.
The list of concerns and scandals attributed to this casino-government
nexus is long-standing and growing. Most recently, during the conservative-far
right Coalition Government that ended in May 2019, a highly controversial
appointment of the financial director of Casinos Austria was made by the far
right Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreich, FPÖ) despite a
headhunter describing the candidate as unqualified for the position due to his
lack of experience in managing a big company.3 The so-called ‘casino affair’ that
followed this appointment once more raised concerns about political interference
in the management of Austrian casinos and brought Austria’s casino regulation
into the international spotlight.4
This article critically outlines the evolution and operation of the regulation
and management of Austria’s casinos, drawing particular attention to the
concerns and conflicts arising from political participation and interference in
Austria’s casino industry and the federal Ministry of Finance’s obligation to
regulate casino operations and raise taxes whilst protecting problem gamblers
and other vulnerable groups. In order to examine Austria’s casino regulation and
to make the content of this paper more accessible to an international audience,
the article first explains the historical development of casino gambling in Austria
(Part II), outlines the legal framework of the State’s gambling monopoly (III),
before turning to the licensing procedure and governance of Casinos Austria AG
1

GLÜCKSSPIELGESETZ [GSP G] [GAMBLING ACT] BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL]
No. 620/1989, as amended, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Erv/
ERV_1989_620/ERV_1989_620.pdf (hereinafter “Gambling Act”).
2
GLÜCKSSPIELGESETZ-NOVELLE 2010 [GSPG-NOVELLE 2010] [GAMBLING ACT
AMENDMENT 2010] BUNDESGESETZBLATT I [BGBL I] No. 73/2010, § 5, ¶ 5,
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2010_I_73/BGBLA_201
0_I_73.html.
3
Josef Redl & Nina Horaczek, Dem Glück Auf Die Sprünge Geholfen?, FALTER
(Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.falter.at/zeitung/20190820/dem-glueck-auf-diespruenge-geholfen.
4
Sam Jones, Austria Prepares to Give Casino Scandal Probe Sweeping Powers,
FIN. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/d5c6876c-1023-11ea-a7e662bf4f9e548a.
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(IV), and lastly to regulations concerning the protection of casino gamblers. The
article closes with a summary of observations and a reflection on the way ahead
in the concluding part V.

II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE AUSTRIAN CASINO INDUSTRY
Public gambling was a rare occurrence in Austria up until the 18 th century.
For the most part, public gambling was considered to be an offence against public
order and safety.5 Only privileged individuals and the state-owned ‘Oriental
Compagnie’ trading company were allowed to offer lottery games; the latter
offered gambling to the public commercially as a way to raise revenue, especially
for the State.6 While public gambling was widely prohibited, the lottery became
a financial success, much to the benefit of state coffers.7
A. Origins of the gambling monopoly.
Empress Maria Theresa of Austria (Marie Thérese d’Autriche) changed
gambling laws to set up a monopoly over gambling for the State in a manner that
continues to exist in Austrian law today. In 1751, she issued a lease over the right
to operate the existing lottery to an Italian company led by Conte Ottavio di
Cattaldi who had earned himself a reputation for successfully — and profitably
— operating lotteries in Italy 8 Payments for this lease generated considerable
income for her government and later served as the model for today’s casino levy.9
Cattaldi held the lease until 1770 when Andre Baratta & Comp took over the
company.
In 1787, emperor Joseph II nationalized the lotteries and formed a stateowned oversight entity (called the ‘Lottogefälligkeitsdirektion’) to ensure more
effective control over existing gambling operations.10 Furthermore, the new
regulations permitted private companies to obtain the right to organize games of
chance if they agreed to pay 10 percent of their revenue to the State.11
Lotteries thus became the first type of state-controlled gambling in Austria.
This system was established purely for fiscal reasons, in particular to prevent
5

ERNST SEELIG, DAS GLÜCKSSPIELSTRAFRECHT 133–134 (1923).
HERMINE
BREITSCHÄDEL,
DAS
GLÜCKSSPIELWESEN
UND
DAS
GLÜCKSSPIELMONOPOL IN ÖSTERREICH 7 (1961).
7
WALTER SCHWARTZ, STRUKTURFRAGEN UND AUSGEWÄHLTE PROBLEME SES
ÖSTERREICHISCHEN GLÜCKSSPIELRECHTS 8–9 (1998).
8
JULIA KOHL, DAS ÖSTERREICHISCHE GLÜCKSSPIELMONOPOL 8 (2013); PETER
ERLACHER, GLÜCKSSPIELGESETZ 139 (1997); MARK LUTTER, MÄRKTE FÜR
TRÄUME: DIE SOZIOLOGIE DES LOTTOSPIELS 42 (2010).
9
WALTER SCHWARTZ, STRUKTURFRAGEN UND AUSGEWÄHLTE PROBLEME SES
ÖSTERREICHISCHEN GLÜCKSSPIELRECHTS 10–11 (1998).
10
Id.; KOHL, supra note 8 at 8–9; ERLACHER, supra note 8 at 139.
11
KOHL, supra note 8 at 8–9.
6
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Austrians from going to another country to gamble and thus increase state
revenue.12 Moreover, lotteries were the only legalized game of chance. Casino
games that are common today, such as poker, baccarat or roulette were
prohibited. Offering games of chance to the public was a criminal offence 13 as
was allowing a venue to be used for gambling and participating in a prohibited
game (i.e. gambling).14
B. A short history of Austria’s casinos
It was not until the inter-war years that games that are commonly played in
casinos today were first offered legally when in 1933 the Regulation over
Exercising the Exclusive Right under Federal Law to Operate Casinos and
‘Kursaal’ Entertainment Halls (Verordnung über die Ausübung des
ausschließlichen Rechts des Bundes zum Betriebe von Spielbanken und
Kursaalhallen) was enacted.15 Much like the regulations established under the
reign of Maria Theresa in 1751, the right to operate casinos was vested in the
Austrian Federal Government who was authorized to transfer this right to private
entities by way of licensing.16
The Österreichische Casino AG obtained the first casino license under the
Casino Regulations 1933 and opened its first casino in 1934 in the exclusive
Panhans Hotel located in the Semmering mountain area, a popular holiday spot
some 80 kms south of the capital Vienna. By 1937, Österreichische Casino AG
had opened seven more casinos, most of them in popular tourist destinations
across Austria, including Baden in Lower Austria, Salzburg City, Kitzbühel in
Tyrol, and Bad Gastein in Salzburg State. During the summer months, additional
casinos were operating in Pörtschach in Carinthia, and in Ischgl and Igls in
Tyrol.17 Unlike the Gambling Act of 1989, which remains in operation today, the
Casino Regulations 1933 did not limit the number of casino licenses that can be
issued.18
The Casino Regulation 1933 gave the Ministry of Finance a central role in
the enforcement of the rules under the Regulations, a role the Ministry continues
to exercise today. This includes full supervisory powers over casino operations
12

HERMINE
BREITSCHÄDEL,
DAS
GLÜCKSSPIELWESEN
UND
DAS
GLÜCKSSPIELMONOPOL IN ÖSTERREICH 7 (1961).
13
STRAFGESETZ ÜBER VERBRECHEN, VERGEHEN UND UEBERTRETUNGEN [STG]
[ACT ON CRIMES, MISDEMEANORS AND TRANSGRESSIONS] § 522 (1852).
14
Id.
15
VERORDNUNG DES BUNDESMINIFTERS FÜR FINAZEN [ORDINANCE OF THE
FEDERAL MINISTER OF FINANCE] BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] No. 463/1933
(hereinafter “Casino Regulation 1933”).
16
Id. at §1.
17
MARLENE HAARKAMM, MACHEN SIE IHR SPIEL! EINE UNTERSUCHUNG ZUR
ENTWICKLUNG DES GLÜCKSSPIELS MIT BESONDERER BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG DER
CASINOS AUSTRIA AG 76 (2007).
18
Gambling Act § 21(5).
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and the authority to determine the amount and set the rules for the collection of
the casino levy.19 While more recent gambling laws in Austria seek to balance
fiscal motivations with the protection of gamblers,20 the central role and
influence of the Ministry of Finance over casino regulations and the gambling
industry has not changed.
In their early years of operation, Austrian casinos were only open to foreign
tourists while Austrian citizens were barred from entry.21 Nazi-Germany’s
decision to impose a fee of 1,000 Reichsmark on German nationals wanting to
enter Austria (known as the ‘Tausend Mark Sperre’) deterred most travelers from
visiting Austria with the result that government revenue from casinos greatly
decreased.22 As a response, the Austrian legislator amended the Casino
Regulations 1933 to give the well-heeled members of the exclusive ‘Austrian
Cercle’ club permission to enter and gamble in casinos.23 Casinos had to close
their doors altogether after annexation of Austria by Nazi-Germany in 1938.24
After the end of World War II, in 1949 the Österreichische Casino AG
regained its casino licenses which it held until December 31, 1966.25 A new
Gambling Act of 196226 perpetuated the general view that casinos were leisure
facilities set up primarily for tourists.27 To obtain a casino license, applicants
needed to provide proof of how to achieve the best financial outcome of running
a casino and were under an obligation to run (and build where necessary) casinos

19

Casino Regulation 1933 § 5.
GLÜCKSSPIELGESETZ-NOVELLE 2010 [GSPG-NOVELLE 2010] [GAMBLING ACT
AMENDMENT 2010] BUNDESGESETZBLATT I [BGBL I] No. 73/2010,
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2010_I_73/BGBLA_201
0_I_73.html.
21
Casino Regulation 1933 § 9(1).
22
Haarkamm, supra note 17 at 77.
23
Casino Regulation 1933 as amended by KUNDMACHUNG VOM 2. JULI 1934
BETREFFEND DIE ZULASSUNG ZUM SPIELE IN SPIELBANKEN UND BEI
KURSAALSPIELEN [ANNOUNCEMENT OF JULY 2, 1934 REGARDING THE ADMISSION TO
GAMING IN CASINOS AND AT KURSAAL GAMES] BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] No.
06/1934; Rainer Fleckl et al., Wo die Kugel deit 1934 Rollt, ADDENDUM, Oct. 12,
2017), https://www.addendum.org/gluecksspiel/geschichte-casinos-austria/.
24
Haarkamm, supra note 17 at 77.
25
GLÜCKSSPIELGESETZ [GSP G] [GAMBLING ACT] BUNDESGESETZBLATT I [BGBL I]
No. 171/1965, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblPdf/1965_171_0/1965
_171_0.pdf.
26
GLÜCKSSPIELGESETZ [GSPG] [GAMBLING ACT] BUNDESGESETZBLATT I [BGBL
I] No. 169/1962, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblPdf/1962_169_0/
1962_169_0.pdf (hereinafter “Gambling Act 1962”).
27
GLÜCKSSPIELGESETZ [GSP G] [GAMBLING ACT] BUNDESGESETZBLATT I [BGBL I]
No. 407/1974, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblPdf/1974_407_0/1974_
407_0.pdf
20
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in areas with high numbers of international visitors.28 As a result, to this day
nearly all Austrian casinos are located in or near popular tourist destinations. 29
As the expiry of the post-war casino licenses drew closer, then Chancellor
(Prime Minister) Josef Klaus instructed his chief economic advisor Leo Wallner
to garner ideas to revamp Austria’s casino sector. This led to the establishment
of the Österreichische Spielbanken AG, which operates as Casinos Austria AG
since a name change in 1985.30 On January 1, 1968, the Österreichische
Spielbanken AG obtained the licenses to run all existing casinos across Austria
and took over the casino venues of the Österreichische Casino AG. 31 Ever since,
Casinos Austria has been the only company operating casinos in Austria. Casinos
Austria presently operates twelve casinos across the country.

III. GAMBLING MONOPOLY
A. Legislative basis.
Section 3 of the Federal Act of 28 November 1989 to Regulate the
Gambling Sector, or Gambling Act for short, grants the Austrian Government the
exclusive right to conduct games of chance. The term ‘gambling monopoly’
(Glücksspielmonopol) is expressly used in this context. The legislative material
to the Act argues that it is in the community’s best interest to have a stateregulated gambling industry and for the State to have full control over existing
legal gambling options in order to protect gamblers and to be able to effectively
monitor the gambling industry.32
Games of chance are defined in s 1(1) of the Gambling Act to mean ‘a game
in which the result of the game is decided only or predominantly by chance’.
Subsection 1(2) sets out a non-exhaustive list of games of chance for the
purposes of this Act which includes, inter alia, roulette, poker, blackjack, two
aces, bingo, keno, baccarat, as well as common variations of these games.
Section 3 notes that the Gambling Act may make exceptions to the monopoly,
which are further set out in Sections 4 and 5. They include, firstly, games of
chance offered privately (Section 4(1)). The goal here is to decriminalize private

28

Gambling Act 1962 § 21.
PETER ERLACHER, GLÜCKSSPIELGESETZ 141-42 (1997).
30
Haarkamm, supra note 17 at 78.
31
GLÜCKSSPIELGESETZ [GSP G] [GAMBLING ACT] BUNDESGESETZBLATT I [BGBL I]
No. 226/1972, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblPdf/1972_226_0/1972_
226_0.pdf.
32
Nationalrat [NR] [National Assembly] [Gesetzgbungsperiode] [GP] Beilage [Blg]
No. 1067 15, https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XVII/I/I_01067/
imfname_265403.pdf
29
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gambling which is conducted for merely for low-value entertainment.33
Secondly, exceptions are made for the operation of ‘automated gambling
machines’ (commonly referred to as poker or slot machines) which are regulated
under the laws of Austria’s nine States (Section 5).
Despite the term ‘gambling monopoly’, the Austrian State does not itself
offer or organize any kind of gambling or own or run any gambling venues.
Casinos as well as the lottery (Sections 6–12) are run by private entities, some of
which are part-owned or partly controlled by the State. The Austrian Government
maintains full control over the scope of the gambling monopoly and over the
right to transfer the operation of certain games of chance to other entities, as
provided for in the Gambling Act.34 Sole responsibility has been vested in the
Ministry of Finance which can transfer the right to operate casinos and entrust a
private entity with organizing games of chance by way of licensing (Section 21).
That right has been transferred, as mentioned, to Casinos Austria, a company that
operates all of Austria’s 12 casinos, that generates considerable income for state
coffers,35 and that, operating as Casinos Austria International (CAI), has grown
into one of the ‘leading players in the global gaming industry’.36
B. Constitutional issues
By definition, a monopoly held by the State excludes private entities from
offering the services captured by that monopoly.37 Nevertheless, a private entity
manages the casino business across Austria; a market that is presently limited by
the State to fifteen casino licenses each valid for a period of fifteen years.38
Twelve of these licenses are currently held by Casinos Austria; the remaining
three licenses are currently dormant after their last allocation had to be annulled.
The creation of a monopoly over an industry such as gambling, and the
decision by the Ministry of Finance over whether and to whom to issue licenses,
limits the constitutionally enshrined right to freely choose and pursue his or her
occupation under article 18 of the Basic Law on the General Rights of
Nationals.39 Restrictions of this right are permissible only if they are in the public
33

Ronald Bresich, Alexander Klingenbrunner, & Gernot Posch, § 4 Ausnahmen aus
dem Glückspielmonopol in GLÜCKSSPIELGESETZ 116 [4]–[5] (Gerhard Strejcek &
Ronald Bresich eds., 2d ed. 2011).
34
HEINZ MAYER, STAATSMONOPOLE 265 (Springer 1976); PETER ERLACHER,
GLÜCKSSPIELGESETZ 114 (2d ed. 1997).
35
PETER ERLACHER, GLÜCKSSPIELGESETZ 143–46 (2d ed. 1997).
36
CASINOS AUSTRIA INTERNATIONAL,
Four
Decades
of Success,
https://www.casinosaustriainternational.com (last visited on Apr. 7, 2021).
37
HEINZ MAYER, STAATSMONOPOLE 6 (Springer 1976).
38
Gambling Act § 21(5), (7).
39
STAATSGRUNDGESETZ VOM 21. DECEMBER 1867, UBER DIE ALLGEMEINEN
RECHTE DER STAATSBURDER FUR DIE IM REICHSRATHE CERTRETENEN KONIGREICHE
UND LANDER – STGG [Basic Law of December 21, 1867 on the General Rights of
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interest and are able to meet their purpose adequately and proportionately.40 In
the context of the Austrian gambling monopoly, that purpose is to prevent
problem gambling and crimes committed in connection with gambling.41
It has been argued that the more restrictive the regulation imposed on
gambling, the easier it is to contain and reduce so-called ‘external costs’, such as
problem gambling and gambling-related criminal activity.42 These cost factors,
problem gambling in particular, do not only affect those gambling or otherwise
frequently visiting gambling venues, but also their families, their place of
employment and wider social environments, and the general public that has to
bear the costs and provide services and infrastructure to deal with the
consequences of problem gambling and criminal activities. On this basis,
Austria’s Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof (VfGH)) in 1989
declared the limitations placed on the availability of casino licenses to be in
conformity with the Austrian Constitution, arguing that this set-up ensures
effective monitoring of the casino industry by the Austrian Government.43
In this context it is worth noting that the number of available casino licenses
under Austria’s casino laws was limited by Section 21(5) of the Gambling Act of
1962. In 1965, that number was set at seven;44 in 1972, an eighth license was
added ‘for the purpose of promoting tourism.’45 The number of licenses has since
increased to a total of fifteen, a number that has not changed since 2010 (s 21(5)
Gambling Act 1989). This increase has been justified by the legislator by the
growing wealth of the Austrian population which, in turn, has led to a rise in
demand for casino gambling.46 It is thus evident that fiscal interests drive the size
Nationals in the Kingdoms and Lander represented in the Council of the Realm]
REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBl] No. 142/1867, as enacted in BUNDESGESETZBLATT
[BGBl] No. 684/1988, art. 18, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/
84888/94739/F1929157981/AUT84888.pdf.
40
THEO ÖHLINGER & EBERHARD HARALD, VERFASSUNGSRECHT 885–93 (12th ed.
2019).
41
Bresich, et al., supra note 33 at 89.
42
Id. at 243–44.
43
Nationalrat [NR] [National Assembly] [Gesetzgbungsperiode] [GP] 17 Beilage
[Blg] No. 1067 15, https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XVII/I/I_01067/
imfname_265403.pdf; Verfassungsgerichtshof [VfGH][Constutitonal Court] Sept.
30, 1989, B1278/88, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Vfgh/JFR_10109070
_88B01278_01/JFR_10109070_88B01278_01.pdf.
44
GLÜCKSSPIELGESETZ [GSP G] [GAMBLING ACT] BUNDESGESETZBLATT I [BGBL I]
No. 171/1965, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblPdf/1965_171_0/1965
_171_0.pdf.
45
Nationalrat [NR] [National Assembly] [Gesetzgbungsperiode] [GP] 10 Beilage
[Blg]
No.
280
1–2,
https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XIII/I/I_00280/imfname_318538.pdf.
46
Nationalrat [NR] [National Assembly] [Gesetzgbungsperiode] [GP] 17 Beilage
[Blg] No. 1067 19, https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XVII/I/I_01067/
imfname_265403.pdf
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and expansion of Austria’s gambling monopoly. This raises concerns since
problem gamblers contribute substantially to casino revenues. 47 On the surface,
this appears to contradict the Constitutional Court’s view that the monopoly and
restrictive licensing predominantly serves protection and monitoring purposes.
C. Profit vs. protection.
The legislator’s primary intention to prevent problem gambling and protect
gamblers48 appears to be at odds with the financial benefits the State receives
from casinos, in particular the taxes, fees, and social security contributions paid
by Casinos Austria. Casino operators must pay an annual levy of 30% of its
revenue to the Ministry of Finance.49 In addition, the State profits from casino
revenue as one of the principal shareholders of Casinos Austria. Accurate, up-todate, and complete figures documenting the income generated by the State from
casino operations in Austria are, regrettably, not available.
Unlike income generated by Austria’s national lotteries (Österreichische
Lotterien), casino revenues earned by the State need not be used for specific, in
particular charitable, purposes. Austrian lotteries, for instance, must by law
contribute EUR 80 million annually to sporting events pursuant to section 20 of
the Gambling Act. It is not immediately clear from the available sources why
casino revenue is historically (and not only in Austria) not used in a similar way
to support, for instance, cultural events or invest in research into problem
gambling.
D. Compliance with European Union law.
The design and set up of Austria’s gambling monopoly raise several
concerns about compliance with European Union (EU) law. Although nothing
bars companies based outside Austria from applying for a casino license,
restrictions associated with the monopoly may conflict with the freedom of
establishment and the freedom to provide services enshrined in articles 16, 49 to
55, and 56 to 62 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union.50 These
freedoms guarantee mobility of businesses and professionals within the EU. The
freedom of services provides a person with the right to provide services

47

Oliver Scheibenbogen, Spielsuchtprävention Im Spannungsfeld Zwischen
Wirtschaftlichen Interessen Und Aktivem Spielerschutz in RAUSCH at 35 (2012);
INGO FIEDLER ET AL., WIRKSAMKEIT VON SOZIALKONZEPTEN BEI
GLÜCKSSPIELANBIETERN 35–44 (2017).
48
Nationalrat [NR] [National Assembly] [Gesetzgbungsperiode] [GP] 24 Beilage
[Blg] No. 657 3, https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/I/I_00657/
fnameorig_183805.html.
49
Gambling Act § 28.
50
Bresich, et al., supra note 33 at 95.
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throughout the EU without setting up a company.51 Freedom of establishment
involves the right to carry out economic activity in another EU Member State. 52
Concerns over violations of these freedoms brought Austria’s gambling
monopoly to the attention of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Since, by
nature, any monopoly limits these basic freedoms, in a 2003 decision, the ECJ
held that a gambling monopoly can only be justified if its main purpose is to set
up the specific industry, which in the context of gambling involves the protection
of gamblers and the prevention and suppression of fraud, money laundering, and
other crime. Financial benefits for the State (or any other provider) may be a
side-effect of the monopoly but must not be its main purpose.53 The ECJ further
requires that the regulation of the monopoly must be implemented in a coherent
and systematic manner by Member States.54
In its decision, the ECJ noted that a coherent and systematic regulatory
framework designed to effectively monitor the casino industry appears to be at
odds with measures to grow revenue, expand the casino industry, and engage in
aggressive advertising.55 The ECJ further held that the coherence of gambling
laws and policies must be viewed in context of the entire gambling sector and
should not be looked at in isolation, i.e. by focusing on individual industries,
such as casinos.56 It is further required that the gambling industry is monitored
effectively and independently by a gambling authority.57
In sum, the ECJ found the Austrian gambling monopoly to be a legitimate
way to set up the casino industry and thus reduce lawful gambling options.58 The
ECJ made no final ruling on the question of whether this system provides a
coherent and systematic way to protect gamblers; the determination of this
question was left to national courts.59
In 2016, Austria’s Constitutional Court and the Administrative Court
(Verwaltungsgerichtshof (VwGH)) found the gambling monopoly to be in

51

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012 O.J. Consol. 326.
Id. at art. 49.
53
Case C-243/01, Gambelli 2003 E.C.R. I-13031, paras. 60–62; Case C-347/09,
Dickinger/Ömer 2011 E.C.R. I-8185, para. 6 .
54
Case
C-375/17,
Stanley
International
Betting/Stanleybet
Malta,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:1026, para. 27.
55
Id.; Case C-243/01, Gambelli, 2003 E.C.R. I-13031, paras. 60–62.
56
Case C-46/08, Carmen Media Group Ltd v. Schleswig-Holstein, 2010 E.C.R. I8149, para. 67.
57
Case
C-375/17,
Stanley
International
Betting/Stanleybet
Malta,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:1026, paras. 33–35.
58
See, for example, Case C-64/08, Engelmann, 2010 E.C.R. I-8219; Case C-347/09,
Dickinger/Ömer 2011 E.C.R. I-8185, para. 6; Case C-46/08, Carmen Media Group
Ltd v. Schleswig-Holstein, 2010 E.C.R. I-8149, para. 67.
59
Case
C-375/17,
Stanley
International
Betting/Stanleybet
Malta,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:1026, 33–34.
52
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conformity with EU Law.60 The Administrative Court argued that gamblers are
better protected in a state-controlled gambling industry and that comprehensive
monitoring mechanisms—which are discussed later in this piece—have been put
in place to enforce protection measures for gamblers in Austria’s casinos. 61 The
Constitutional Court further noted that while the number of casinos operating in
Austria had risen over the years, the scale of problem gambling had not markedly
increased since 2009.62 Indeed, the Court found that that the growing number of
available licenses for casinos and major advertising for legal gambling venues
had the effect that more people chose to engage in legal rather than illegal
activities.63
These positions have found little support in the literature and the prevailing
scholarly opinion is that Austria’s gambling monopoly is at odds with EU law. 64
This view is based, firstly, on the fact that automated gambling machines fall
under the mandate of State rather than federal law in Austria, thus contradicting
the claim that gambling regulations are consolidated and uniform across the
country.65 A second point is that when the Austrian legislator increased the
number of available casino licenses in 2010, this was done without any
explanation showing how effective monitoring of a greater number of casinos,
and presumably a greater number of (problem) gamblers, can be ensured.66 While
the Ministry of Finance never fully exhausted the limit of available licenses, the
statutory increase of the number of available licenses alone might be seen as an
expansion of the casino industry in contravention of the 2003 ECJ ruling.67
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Overall, the approach taken by Austria’s Gambling Act reflects a highly
protective if not protectionist approach which is instrumentalized through
monitoring powers vested in a central gambling authority, the Ministry of
Finance. A closer look, however, reveals other problems, especially the fact that
the regulating authority is a part-owner of the sole operator of casinos in Austria,
the Casinos Austria AG. It is highly doubtful that this set up makes for effective
and independent monitoring, as required by the ECJ.68 Neither the Constitutional
Court nor the Administrative Court questioned this relationship between the
Ministry of Finance and Casinos Austria or explored perceptions that this role of
the Ministry of Finance might be seen as bias by design.69

IV. LICENSING PROCEDURE
The process used to award a license to open and operate a casino in Austria
must involve a public, transparent, and non-discriminatory tender for interested
parties. The Ministry of Finance is in charge of this process all the way from
calling for applications to awarding the license and proclaiming the award
through an official administrative notice.70 For license holders, the Ministry
prescribes the games that may be offered in the casino, sets standards for the
protection of gamblers, and even determines the opening hours and entry fees of
casinos.71 The games offered in the casino must involve live games and cannot
be limited to automated gambling machines only.72
The procedure to award casino licenses starts with an announcement by the
Ministry of Finance that it intends to distribute one or more licenses. This
announcement has to specify the requirements that applicants must meet a
deadline, which must be set in a manner allowing would-be applicants sufficient
time to prepare their applications.73 The announcement must be a gazette in the
Wiener Zeitung, Austria’s official daily,74 a process that was approved and found
to be sufficiently transparent by a decision of the Administrative Court in 2005.75
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A. Requirements for Obtaining a License.
By law, the number of casino licenses is presently limited to 15; each
license, once granted, is valid for a period of 15 years.76 Once all casino licenses
have been awarded, no further application or licensing procedure may be started.
To be eligible to apply for and to be awarded a license, applicants must be
incorporated as a joint stock company based in an EU Member State. 77 While it
is not a prerequisite for the applicant company to be a registered business in
Austria, it is necessary to demonstrate that the Member State in which the
company is headquartered maintains laws and regulations over gaming
operations equally as effective and comprehensive as Austria’s Gambling Act.78
To make this determination, the Ministry of Finance must be given information
on any prior casino operation by the applicant company along with an agreement
by the gambling authority of the other EU Member State showing that it will
cooperate with Austria’s Ministry of Finance in the sharing of information. 79 To
ensure that license holders have adequate liquidity, the applicant company must
have a share capital of at least EUR 22 million at its disposal.80 This amount is
seen as necessary for licensees to make investments and to cover them for
financial losses that may stem from their gambling operations. 81
Decisions about awarding the license are based on criteria relating to prior
experience in the casino industry, infrastructure, and the implementation of
mechanisms to prevent problem gambling, money laundering, and other criminal
activities.82 The weighting of the selection criteria and the allocation of points
for each criterion must be made transparent by the Ministry of Finance, as
confirmed by the Administrative Court in a 2016 decision.83
The ability of companies from outside Austria to apply for a casino license
is a relatively recent development. For the longest time, Austria refused to accept
applications from abroad arguing adequate monitoring could not be ensured if
the applicant company was not based in Austria.84 In 2010, the ECJ rejected this
76
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position, forcing the Austrian legislator to introduce a transparency clause into
the Gambling Act thus permitting applications from other parts of the EU.85
Casinos Austria, a joint stock company (AG) incorporated in Austria, holds
12 casino licenses; the remaining three are currently not awarded. When they
were awarded to another company in 2014,86 Casinos Austria successfully filed
a complaint saying that the procedure used to award these three licenses lacked
transparency. The Administrative Court subsequently accepted this position and
revoked these three licenses because the Ministry of Finance had failed to
publicize the weighting of the selection criteria in sufficient detail. 87 Although
several years have passed since this decision, no new application process to
award the remaining licenses has yet been started. This is because the mandatory
transparency clause has not yet been integrated into the Ministry of Finance’s
licensing procedure. A further practical hurdle to award these licenses stems
from the fact that the awarding of licenses in so-called packages, which are
discussed in the following section, appears to conflict with transparency
requirement.88
B. Urban and regional casinos.
The award of casino licenses in Austria has been clustered by the Ministry
of Finance into two groups, or packages as they are referred to: one group (the
‘Stadtpaket’) comprises six licenses for casinos in metropolitan, urban areas. The
other (the ‘Landpaket’) comprises a further six licenses for casinos located in
regional, tourist destinations. The casinos located in the State capitals Bregenz,
Graz, Innsbruck, Linz, Salzburg, and Vienna are part of the ‘urban package’; the
‘regional package’ includes the casinos located in Baden, Kitzbühel,
Kleinwalstertal, Seefeld, Velden, and Zell am See.89
When these twelve licenses were last awarded in 2012 (‘Stadtpaket’) and
2013 (‘Landpaket’), interested parties could only apply for one whole package
of licenses; it was not possible to apply for and obtain a licence for a single

85

See Gambling Act § 21. See Nationalrat [NR] [National Assembly]
[Gesetzgbungsperiode]
[GP]
24
Beilage
[Blg]
No.
783
1,
https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/VHG/XXIV/I/I_00783/fname_188663.pdf;
Cornelia Lanser, Transparenzgrundsatz im Glücksspielrecht, in Ecolex 644, 645–
646 (2016).
86
Id. at 150.
87
VERWALTUNGSGERICHTSHOF [VWGH] [ADMINISTRATIVE COURT], June 28, 2016,
Ra 2015/17/0082, https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Vwgh/
JWR_2015170082_20160628L01/JWR_2015170082_20160628L01.pdf
88
Heinz Mayer, ‘Spielbanken im “Paket”’ (2012) 174(2) Ecolex 174, 174; Jeannine
Weissel and Manuel Vogelsberger, ‘Zur Zulässigkeit der Ausschreibung von
Spielbanken-Konzessionen in “Paketen”’ (2012) 181(2) Ecolex 181, 181.
89
Jeannine Weissel and Manuel Vogelsberger, ‘Zur Zulässigkeit der Ausschreibung
von Spielbanken-Konzessionen in “Paketen”’ (2012) 181(2) Ecolex 181, 181.

Spring 2021] REGULATION OF AUSTRIA’S CASINO INDUSTRY

307

location only.90 The clustering of licenses in this way was done mostly for
reasons of efficiency and economy. It has been argued that a lower number of
casino gambling providers makes monitoring of their management and operation
much easier and lowers the costs for the authorities. It can also ensure greater
consistency between the measures taken in different locations and makes it easier
to award licenses for locations that, on their own, may be less attractive and less
profitable.91
The ‘packaging’, however, raises concerns about transparency and legality.
It is essential that licenses are distributed in a fair and reliable manner and that
applicants have fair and equal chances to obtain a casino license.92 Section 21(1)
of the Gambling Act makes no mention of awarding licenses in packages and
only refers to the award of a single license by the Ministry of Finance to a private
operator/licensee.
Awarding licenses in groups greatly increases the amount of capital
necessary to obtain a casino license thus disqualifying smaller companies that do
not have the financial resources to pay for more than one (or less than six)
licenses and set up casino operations in more than one location. The pool of
applicants sufficiently resourced to open and operate six casinos at the same time
is considerably smaller than it would be otherwise.93 The application fee for one
license alone is EUR 10 000 and the licensing fee a further EUR 100 000. Put
simply, there are many applicants that will be deterred by or unable to pay these
fees when multiplied by six.94 In addition, a minimum deposit of ten percent of
the share capital (thus currently amount to EUR 2.2 million) needs to be paid
when the license is granted, thus increasing the financial burden on casino
operators. It makes no difference, however, whether the licensee holds one or
more casino licenses; the required stock capital remains the same.95
It is also worth noting in this context that the Austrian Audit Office
(Rechnungshof) estimates the value of the ‘urban package’ to be about three
times higher than the value of ‘regional package’,96 yet the conditions and costs
for both packages are the same. There is no information on whether the Ministry
of Finance considered or was aware of these circumstances at the time it called
for applications for both packages, yet it is perhaps not surprising that only one
Heinz Mayer, ‘Spielbanken im “Paket”’ (2012) 174(2) Ecolex 174, 174.
See also RECHNUNGSHOF, VERGABE DER GLÜCKSSPIELKONZESSIONEN DES
BUNDES 2015 [COURT OF AUDITORS REPORT 2015] 150 (2016).
92
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company applied for the licenses in the ‘regional package”: that is Casinos
Austria.97 The ‘urban package’ only attracted applicants from two competitors:
Casinos Austria and Novomatic,98 an Austria-based, international gambling
company operating casinos in forty-three countries worldwide (and with its own
share of controversies, including ties to many (ex-)politicians in Austria).99
The costs and process of the application and licensing procedure has
evidently deterred many smaller and foreign companies from applying for
licenses when the latest call for applications was made in 2011. It has been
reported that several applicants were interested in applying for one license or for
particular locations only but were unable to do so under the package system.100
For example, Swiss Casinos Holding, a Zurich-based company operating five
casinos in northern Switzerland sought to apply for a license to run the Bregenz
casino only but was disqualified by the way the licenses were clustered, leading
a Swiss newspaper to suggest that the call for applications was not only designed
specifically for, but written by the semi-state owned Casinos Austria company.101
Right from the start of the 2011 process, it was clear that Casinos Austria would
be much better positioned than any other applicant, having the necessary
infrastructure and experience of simultaneously running multiple casinos across
Austria. It is also for this reason, that Casinos Austria outbid the Novomatic
application for the urban package as it used its pre-existing infrastructure,
marketing, and measures to prevent problem gamblers and protect gamblers as a
main advantage over other contenders, as was noted by the Austrian Audit Office
in a 2016 report.102
In sum, there are serious concerns over the current licensing practice with
regards to transparency and non-discrimination as mandated by section 21(1) of
the Gambling Act. It would be highly desirable to design future application
procedures more competitive and allow other operators, including smaller
companies to apply for individual licenses. Furthermore, it may be worth
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revisiting the fees and levies associated with the application for and award of
casino licenses, taking into account the actual and potential value of different
locations, their scale of operations, number and types of visitors et cetera. At a
minimum, any future ‘packaging’ should involve smaller ‘packages’ of
comparable size and value, for instance by combining or pairing licenses for
urban and regional locations, thus boosting casinos in regional tourist
destinations. This would be a first step yet go a long way towards greater
transparency, fairness, and competitiveness in the licensing process.
C.

Casinos Austria AG

Casinos Austria is the only company operating casinos in Austria and thus
has a quasi-monopoly over casino gambling in this country. 103 In addition to
operating all 12 existing casinos across Austria, the company owns a share of the
national lotteries, the Österreichische Lotterien, and is involved in the online
gaming industry, partially owning the ‘win2day’ brand and several video lottery
terminals operated by WinWin.104 Casino Austria’s parent company, Casinos
Austria International, operates 23 other casinos around the world.105
As mentioned, all 12 casinos in urban and regional Austria are presently
owned and operated by Casinos Austria. The six licenses for the casinos in the
State capitals are valid until 21 December 2027; the licenses for the six casinos
in regional Austria expire on 31 December 2030.106 The biggest casino in size is
located in Baden, Lower Austria, a short distance from the nation’s capital
Vienna. In 1995, Baden was the largest casino operating in Europe.107 In terms
of revenue, the casino located in Vienna’s city centre has the highest turnover,
followed by the casino in Bregenz located on the shores of Lake Constance in
Vorarlberg.108
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1. Management.
As a publicly listed company, corporate structures and management of
Casinos Austria are regulated by the Stock Companies Act of 1965.109 The
chairperson of the company is appointed and his or her activities are supervised
by a supervisory board which is appointed by the company’s shareholders.110
Concerns have been raised about political ties of members of the
supervisory board to political figures and, vice versa, about political influence
exercised over the management of Casinos Austria, not least because the
supervisory board decides the appointment of the chairperson of Casinos
Austria.111 This concern is augmented by the fact that the Ministry of Finance
represents the Austrian Government on the supervisory board and has influence
over ÖBAG, one of the main shareholders of the company. A recent media report
reveals examples of how the Ministry of Finance influence decisions of the
supervisory board and demonstrates how political control over the company may
be exercised, especially if politicians seek to influence board members by
promising benefits to them in return for favorable decisions.112
Section 31b(8) of the Gambling Act stipulates several requirements to carry
out management positions of Casinos Austria. Persons in these positions have to
be of fit and proper character and suitable for the position based on their
qualifications and prior experience.113 If a person is later found to be unsuitable,
the Ministry of Finance has the power to issue a notice suspending the voting
rights of that person.114
2. Shareholders.
In 2019, the biggest shareholder of Casinos Austria was the SAZKA Group
followed by the Austrian Government. Shares held by the Austrian Government
are administered by the Österreichische Beteiligungs AG (ÖBAG), a holding
company administering State investments and holdings, such as Post AG
(Austria’s postal service) and OMV, an Austrian oil and gas company.
Novomatic was the third biggest shareholder until it decided in 2019 to sell its
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shares to the SAZKA Group, thus making SAZKA the majority shareholder.115
This sale was made public only a week after Casinos Austria dismissed its
financial director whose appointment attracted much criticism and
controversy.116
The SAZKA Group is a lottery, online gaming, and sports betting operator
headquartered in Prague, Czech Republic. The group of companies’ operation
span across Europe, with their main lottery and sports betting market in Italy
(where they own Lotto Italia), Croatia (Super Sport), Greece and Cyprus
(Opap).117 The SAZKA Group’s shares in Casinos Austria are held by a
subsidiary called Medial Holding (Media), a company of which Casinos Austria
owns some shares. 118 The impact and influence of Casinos Austria on Medial is
not publicly documented and the SAZKA Group decided to place the shares
bought form Novomatic into another subsidiary, 119 thus bringing them out of the
influence of Casinos Austria.
While SAZKA is the majority shareholder of Casinos Austria, its influence
has been curtailed by an arrangement made between the SAZKA Group and
ÖBAG in order to protect and strengthen the position of the Austrian
Government as minority shareholder. The agreement, inter alia, reserves the right
to appoint some leading positions such as the chair and some members of the
supervisory board for ÖBAG.120 SAZKA entered into this agreement after
ÖBAG agreed to waive its preemptive right to purchase part of the shares sold
by Novomatic.121
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3. Governmental Participation.
ÖBAG is the de-facto representative of the Austrian Government in
Casinos Austria and is meant to act in the best interest of the country. The
Austrian Government does not directly participate in the decision-making of
Casinos Austria. The Secretary-General of ÖBAG sits in the shareholders’
meeting of Casino’s Austria.122 The Ministry of Finance represent the Austrian
Government in the shareholders’ meeting of ÖBAG.123 Through ÖBAG, the
Austrian Government indirectly exercises further influence on the management
and strategies of Casinos Austria. The management of ÖBAG is obliged to issue
quarterly reports to the Minister of Finance and annual reports to the Austrian
Government about decisions made by the state holding company. The Ministry
can request additional information at any time.124
The Ministry of Finance thus exercises two function and pursues goals that
may be contradictory: On the one hand, it acts as the monitoring authority of
Austria’s casinos industry and seeks to keep the industry ‘clean’, transparent,
working to high standards, and protecting gamblers. On the other hand, directly
and indirectly, it seeks to increase and benefit from casino revenue through
levies, taxes, and profits. On the surface, this raises concerns about how the
Ministry of Finance can balance or reconcile these seemingly conflicting goals
and execute its functions and powers under the Gambling Act fairly and
objectively. This conflict is particularly evident in the procedures used to license
casinos and in the implementation of measures to protect persons gambling in
Austrian casinos.
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PROTECTION OF GAMBLERS

A 2015 report suggests that about 1.1 percent of the Austrian population (or
some 64,000 people) are pathological gamblers.125 To prevent and reduce
problem gambling, governments are obliged to legislate and implement
comprehensive gambler protection measures in their casino industry; this
approach has been mandated for EU Member States by decisions of the European
Court of Justice.126 When designing relevant regulations to fulfill this obligation,
States must also take into account external costs, such as implications for social
security and welfare. These costs must be balanced against the benefits for the
States including, inter alia, tax revenue, job creation, and profits from shares in
the casino industry.127 The idea here is to keep problem gambling and associated
external costs low while maximizing other gains. Austria’s Gambling Act seeks
to strike this balance by including several measures to prevent problem gambling
in its casino industry.128
A. Preventive monitoring
Casino operators in Austria have an obligation to closely monitor the
gambling behavior of its patrons and must report the measures adopted in the
casino to prevent problem gambling to the Ministry of Finance each year.129
By observing the frequency of their visits and the amounts spent on
gambling, casino operators need to determine whether gamblers put their
livelihoods (and those of their families and dependents) at risk. This is mandated
by section 25 of the Gambling Act which has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court of Austria as a requirement to record and count how often individual
patrons visit casinos.130 Accordingly, names and other personal details of patrons
are recorded upon entry into an Austrian casino at each visit. In a further
125
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decision, the Supreme Court held that casinos must bar gamblers permanently or
for a period of time if the gambler’s income or personal wealth does not
sufficiently cover the frequency and spending of their casino gambling.131
If a casino operator forms the view that an individual gambler jeopardizes
his or her livelihood through his or her casino visits, section 25(3) of the
Gambling Act authorizes casinos to conduct credit checks on the gambler. To
obtain this information, the casino operator can transmit the gambler’s personal
details to Bisnode Austria Holding, a data processing company working closely
with government, and to KSV Kreditschutzverband, an Austrian company, to run
credit checks and conduct credit monitoring.132 If these checks do not provide
sufficient information to make a determination of the financial implications of
the patron’s gambling behavior, employees of the casino are required to conduct
a counselling interview with the relevant patron.133 These assessments may result
in patrons having a limit imposed on their gambling spending or they may even
be barred from entering the casino for a period of time.134 If a casino fails to
implement these protection measures, affected patrons (problem gamblers) may
claim damages if it can be shown that the casinos acted grossly negligent or
knowingly engaged in misconduct.135
While the intention and design of section 25(3) serve laudable purposes,
there has been some criticism of this provision for lacking certainty and
transparency. In particular, it is not clear at what point a casino’s obligation to
run credit checks or otherwise engage with the patron are triggered.136 While
thresholds relating to frequency and spending will necessarily vary between
patrons, it is difficult to see when and how a casino would fail in its preventive
monitoring obligations and under what circumstances a casino would be seen to
act grossly negligently.
131
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B. Gambler protection v data protection.
The way in which personal data of casino patrons is collected, stored, and
shared raises questions about privacy and data protection. The data collected of
patrons and potentially transmitted to other companies for credit checking
include information such as names, residential addresses, and dates of birth. 137
Under standard data protection rules, the processing of such personal data is
permitted only if, for instance, the patron has given express consent or if this is
necessary to comply with legal obligations of the company collecting that data. 138
For Austrian casinos, this obligation arises from section 25(3) under the
Gambling Act. To fulfil the purpose of this provision, it is necessary for the
casino to collect sufficient information about its patrons in order to instigate steps
designed to protect problem gamblers. The transmission of personal data is,
however, only permissible by law if that purpose cannot be reasonably fulfilled
by other means.139 It is thus debatable whether this purpose can be achieved
through less far-reaching measures that greater protect the data of patrons and
ensure some degree of privacy.
One way which has been discussed extensively by the Ministry of Finance
in a 2014 paper would be to issue electronic cards equipped with a chip to each
patron that anonymously records the gambling activity in the casino of any one
person (a ‘Spielerkarte’ or gambler card) and saves that data encrypted on a
server. This may allow casinos to better detect and flag gambling levels and
intervene when set limits or frequencies are reached. It may also serve as a better
way to identify patrons who have been barred because of their gambling
addiction (or for other reasons).140 Keeping these cards anonymous (and
transferable), however, shifts some of the responsibility to prevent problem
gambling from casinos to patrons and may not be an effective way to achieve
that stated goals.
Striking the right balance between the prevention of problem gambling on
the one hand and the protection of patron’s personal data on the other is a difficult
feat for legislators. Greater data protection may compromise the protection of
problem gamblers, and vice versa.
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In addition to the legislative requirements, Casinos Austria has
implemented several other prevention measures which requires the company and
its employees to take action if they suspect instances of problem gambling. This
includes, inter alia, formal registration and screening of patrons upon entry of the
casino using government-issued identity documents.141 The company also offers
patrons to ask for exclusion or restrictive access to casinos.142
In 2018, across all 12 of its venues, Casinos Austria imposed a total of 7,484
‘restrictive measures’ and conducted 620 counselling interviews with potential
problem gamblers.143 In addition, 2,501 persons registered for self-imposed
access restrictions.144
C. Responsible advertising.
The conflict between maximizing financial gains from casino operations on
the one hand and protection of vulnerable patrons on the other is perhaps best
manifested in the rules around advertising. Put simply, aggressive promotion of
the casino industry and advertisements suggesting high wins and luxury lifestyles
are at odds with the objective to prevent problem gambling.145 This may require
limiting the type, content, and channels of advertising casino gambling and
ensuring that gambling, especially problem gambling, does not veer to illegal
venues and other forms of illegal, uncontrolled gambling.146 It is thus perhaps
surprising that in Austria gambling is one of the sectors with the highest
expenditure on advertising.147
In a 2016 decision, Austria’s Constitutional Court made a ruling to ensure
that advertising for casino gambling by Casinos Austria does not lead to an
expansion of the casino market and does not increase the public’s desire to
gamble for money.148 Somewhat contrary to that decision, section 56(1) of the
Gambling Act expressly prevents patrons and competitors to take any action or
make claims if they are of the view that Austria’s casinos do comply with
responsible advertising guidelines.149 Restrictions on advertising may only be
141
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imposed by the gambling authority,150 which, as outline above, may have a
conflict of interest in these circumstances.151
D. Monitoring casinos in relation to protection of gamblers.
Besides licensing Austrian casinos, the Ministry of Finance also has
responsibility to monitor casino operations, ensure they comply with the
Gambling Act, and oversee their implementation of measure to protect gamblers.
To carry out these functions, the Ministry appoints state commissioners
(‘Staatskommissär’) to participate in decision-making procedures of each casino.
These commissioners have the power to object decisions by the supervisory
board and shareholder meetings if they form the view that the decision would
violate relevant regulations any decision.152 The objection by a State
commissioner effectively suspends the decision until the objection has been
resolved.153 As last resort, the Ministry of Finance can suspend a casino license
if the operator fails to implement adequate measures to protect problem
gamblers.154
Questions have been raised for some time about the appropriateness of this
set-up and whether the Ministry of Finance’s position is one where it can fully
determine the terms under which casinos in Austria—i.e. Casinos Austria, a
company in which the Ministry has a major stake—can operate. Because of its
financial interest in Casinos Austria, it is questionable whether the Ministry is
best positioned to effectively monitor the implementation of measures to protect
gamblers at the same time.155
One alternative that has been discussed is the creation of an independent
entity to monitor the implementation of prevention and protection measures, thus
separating the authority over financial aspects of the gambling industry from the
authority charged with monitoring compliance and protection, a set-up that can
be found, for instance, in Germany.156 In March 2020, the then Minister of
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Finance announced that such a set-up would be considered,157 though further
details have yet to be released.

VI. CONCLUSION
Austria’s casino gambling monopoly and the regulatory and institutional
arrangements around it create the impression that the Austrian Government ‘gets
to bake the casino gambling cake and eat it, too’. Surely, the monopoly puts
Austrian authorities into a uniquely privileged position to tightly control the
types and scope of legal gambling options, taking into account fiscal
considerations, demand, and the need to protect vulnerable patrons.158 This level
of control and oversight would not be possible in a more liberalized, competitive
casino market.159 The Austrian legislator has used its monopoly to strictly limit
the number of available casino licenses and give the Ministry of Finance nearly
full control over casino operations, compliance, revenue, and the protection of
gamblers. It is difficult to see how the Ministry can juggle these often conflicting
roles fairly and effectively.
The Ministry of Finance is responsible for the transparent and fair
distribution of casino licenses and for the monitoring of compliance by casinos
with the license conditions and with the provisions stipulated by the Gambling
Act. At the same time, the Ministry is a major beneficiary of high casino revenues
and has a vested interest to increase the profits made by Casinos Austria, the sole
company operating casinos in Austria. In addition, the Ministry of Finance is
required to conduct comprehensive monitoring of casinos to ensure that
gamblers, problem gamblers in particular, are protected and that Austrian casinos
are not used to launder proceeds of crime or for other illicit activities.
It is difficult to reconcile the latter role with its position as a beneficiary and
significant shareholder of Casinos Austria. This set up has been criticized for
obscuring and obstructing independent monitoring of casino operations.160 From
the perspective of Casinos Austria, so long as the overseeing authority partially
owns the company, there is little need to fear losing a casino license if gambler
protection measures are implemented poorly.161 While Casinos Austria may be
on the same page as Austrian authorities in their desire to prevent money
157
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laundering and other crimes committed in casinos, measures to prevent problem
gambling and protect other vulnerable gamblers are squarely at odds with the
desire to increase casino revenue and thus grow company profits and fill State
coffers.162
The legal framework along with its operation in practice clearly work in
favor of Casinos Austria, much at the expense of other competitors from within
and outside the country. The monopoly vested in the Ministry of Finance and the
execution of the resultant powers have put Casinos Austria in a uniquely
privileged position with little to fear from other competitors. This is particularly
evident in the allocation of the ‘packaged’ casino licenses, which make it nearly
impossible for other companies to enter Austria’s casino gambling market. The
allocation of licenses clearly disadvantages smaller companies and discourages
them from applying for a casino license,163 but comes in handy for the
shareholders of Casinos Austria and thus the Austrian Government.
Recent suggestions to create an independent gambling authority is a small
first step to remedy some of these long-standing concerns and reduce the nearly
unlimited power of the Ministry of Finance over Austria’s gambling and casino
industry. Importantly, an independent gambling authority may be better placed
to protect the data and privacy of casino patrons and develop and monitor
measures to prevent problem gambling and protect vulnerable gamblers.
Separating prevention and protection from profit-seeking can be a useful tool to
raise industry standards in the medium and long term.
In December 2019, Austria’s National Assembly discussed a concrete
proposal to sever the authority to grant casino licenses from the power to monitor
casino operators.164 Attempts to vest the power to monitor the implementation of
gambler protection measures in the Ministry of Health were, however, rejected
by parliament.165 Recent acknowledgments by the Coalition Government
comprising the Conservative and Greens parties of the Ministry of Finance’s
inflated role in Austria’s casino market and announcements that its powers may
be curtailed and shifted in part to an independent authority have yet to translate
into concrete proposals and plans of action.166
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What is less clear is whether a new independent gambling authority would
make it harder for politicians to push for gambling policies along party lines and
to be more accountable for political favors asked by party clientele and big
donors. While the Gambling Act contains strict rules for the award of casino
licenses and for casino monitoring, this has not stopped the type of political
scandals and trading of political appointments in casinos in Casinos Austria seen
in the past.
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